The Generalized System of Preferences of the United States as it Affects the Caribbean Basin by Smith, Bryant D.
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 26
The Generalized System of Preferences of the
United States as it Affects the Caribbean Basin
Bryant D. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryant D. Smith, The Generalized System of Preferences of the United States as it Affects the Caribbean Basin, 4 Md. J. Int'l L. 146 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol4/iss1/26
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES OF
THE UNITED STATES AS IT AFFECTS
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Dr. Bryant D. Smith*
This will be a summary of the empirical studies carried out by the
External Sector Program of the OAS, regarding the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) of the United States. The conclusion which emerges
from the current evidence is that its impact on the Basin is, at best, rather
modest, for reasons which will be explained.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
To put the Caribbean Basin in a proper framework, let us first look at
the GSP of the United States in its overall context. The gradual
inauguration of the tariff preference systems for the LDCs by the
developed countries was the result of years of persistence by the LDCs in
UNCTAD. The tariff preference idea was based on the notion that, for a
variety of reasons, the developing countries needed greater market acess
to the wealthy, large markets of the developed countries in semi-industrial
products. After a fair amount of resistance on the part of the developed
countries, the concept of discriminatory treatment in favor of the LDCs
was accepted and preference schemes were gradually introduced.' The
preferences were not coordinated among the developed countries and a
great deal of individuality has thus emerged - eligible products under the
schemes are not necessarily identical, and the rules and limitations which
were imposed in each scheme are peculiar to the country. The United
* Senior Staff member of the External Sector Program of the OAS. This
paper represents the personal opinions of the author and in no way is a statement
of the official position of the OAS.
1. Prior to the imposition of the schemes, concern was expressed that the
schemes would be more cosmetic than substance in terms of the amount of
potential benefits to the LDCs. The degree to which this concern was justified with
regard to the United States system for the Caribbean Basin can be seen in
empirical studies carried out by the OAS for the Western Hemisphere countries.
The results are contained in: Organization of American States, Evaluation of the
First Year's Operation of the United States Generalized System of Preferences,
Part I: Quantitative Analysis, OEA/Ser. H/XIII CIES/CECON/251 (1977) and
Organization of American States, La exclusion de Ecuador y Venezuela como
paises beneficiarios del SGP, antecedentes y analisis cuantitativo. All other data
used is official U.S. trade data from the Department of Commerce, various
computer tape series.
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States was the last major developed country to introduce a GSP scheme in
the Trade Act of 1974,2 and, as might be expected, it had a number of its
own peculiarities and limitations.
In 1976, the first year of operation, the U.S. scheme granted complete
tariff exemption on the importation of 2,728 semi-industrial products
coming from eligible beneficiary countries, out of a total of 6,000 articles
in the TSUS. Of these 2,728 articles, the United States imported from both
beneficiary and non-beneficiary countries $26 billion of imports in 1976
and $31 billion in 1977, which represented in both years twenty-one
percent of total U.S. imports. Of course, the beneficiary countries did not
have the major share of their United States trade in eligible GSP articles.
With respect to the above dollar totals, beneficiary countries secured only
sixteen percent of the market both in 1976 and 1977. Thus, in 1976,
imports of GSP articles by the United States from beneficiary countries
represented only 3.5% of total U.S. imports and only 3.4% of U.S. imports
in 1977 - a rather modest portion for both years.
CARIBBEAN BASIN GSP EXPORTS
Of course, what may be a paltry sum to the United States might be a
significant amount to the Caribbean Basin countries. Looking at the
exports of these countries to the United States, we find that, excluding
Venezuela, which we will consider separately, GSP-subject exports from
the Basin to the U.S. represented ten percent of its total exports to that
country in both 1976 and 1977. This percentage is not an insignificant
portion of the Basin exports to the United States - it represented about
$890 million in 1976 and $1 billion in 1977.
This does not, however, answer the question of what effect the GSP
has on the trade between the Basin and the U.S. This can be roughly
estimated by calculating the trade creation and trade diversion effect of
the tariff reductions under the GSP for the Caribbean Basin countries.
The trade creation value will be the increase in the value of imports from
beneficiary Basin countries replacing United States domestic production
of competitive goods.3 The trade diversion value is the increase of U.S.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1974).
3. Trade creation (TCf ) of product "i" will be:
T C i  M i  li _i "1
where Mi is the initial level of U.S. imports of "i" from the beneficiary country, q i
is the import demand elasticity, andt i is the ad valorem of "i".
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imports from Basin countries which replaces imports from non-
beneficiary sources which do not receive the tariff exemption. 4 Combining
the two values, it was estimated that the total value of trade expansion
which could be attributed to the U.S. GSP for 1976 was approximately
$111 million for the Basin countries with the exception of Venezuela. This
would represent only 1.4% of the value of U.S. imports from the Basin for
1976. This is hardly a significant part of Basin trade with the United
States, and the calculation makes several assumptions which err on the
side of mercy, increasing the calculated benefit.
LEGISLATIVE. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES
GSP SYsTEM
There are several reasons why the potential benefits are surprisingly
low and several other reasons why their magnitude might even be lower
than indicated. While it is not possible to quantify and rank the relative
importance of each of these factors, some data are illuminating.
One reason for the low benefits is the limitations imposed by law on
the eligible products. Under the 1974 Trade Act, any beneficiary country
which exports more than $25 million of an eligible product5 to the United
4. The calculation of trade diversion is based on the indirect method of
Baldwin & T. Murray, MTN Tariff Reductions and Developing Country Trade
Benefits under the GSP (mimeo) (1976), which assumes that the substitutability
between a beneficiary developing country product and similar products of non-
beneficiary countries is not greatly different from the substitutability between a
beneficiary developing country product and a similar product produced in the U.S.
This latter substituability would then be trade creation weighted by the ratio of
imports from non-beneficiary sources to domestic production (minus exports):
TC M non-bfc
Tt  0 &
whr i Mnonbfc
where TDi is the value of trade diversion of product "i " is the U.S.
imports of "i" from non-beneficiary countries, 01 is U.S. domestic production of "il,
and xS is U.S. exports of "i".
5. The $25 million limit is increased each year in proportion to the percentage
increase of the United States GNP. The value was about $33.8 million for 1977.
Also products for which a beneficiary country accounts for 50% or more of U.S.
imports are also denied preferential treatment the subsequent year. This limitation
tends to be an insignificant yet irritating feature of the competitive-need formula
in the majority of cases.
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States in any one year will be excluded from the GSP for the same
product during the subsequent period. An estimate was made as to the
benefits which Basin countries would have received under a trade
creation and diversion effect had the limit not been applied in 1976. The
resulting value was $241 million, more than double the estimated benefit
actually received from the scheme as designed.
It has been frequently argued that this limitation is justifiable since
producers who can export such volume certainly are competitive in the
world market without special help. If the GSP is justified on an infant
industry argument, this is probably true. To the degree it is seen as an
income transfer mechanism, however, the justification is less persuasive,
and considering the resentment which the limitation creates, it would
seem that the United States pays a high price for such a small savings.
The product coverage is another obvious cause of the modest
potential of the GSP as presently structured. The Trade Act of 1974 itself
excluded a number of important product categories such as textiles,
wearing apparel and footwear. Even without tampering with these so-
called "import-sensitive" products, it would be possible to significantly
expand GSP benefits through an expansion of the product coverage. The
countries of the Caribbean and Latin America expressed through the
OAS their interest in the inclusion of a number of products within the
scheme which were not then eligible nor on the exclusionary import-
sensitive list. It was calculated that their inclusion would have
represented a benefit to the Basin countries through trade creation and
diversion of $128 million, more than the estimated benefits conferred by
the scheme as constituted. Depsite these modest costs, the United States
has been extremely reluctant to extend GSP product coverage to any
important degree.
An inherent limitation of the GSP is the fact that the tariff rates on
most goods granted eligibility are already low. Thus, little advantage is
conferred on a beneficiary country relative to a non-beneficiary competi-
tor or U.S. producer of a like product. An analysis of U.S. tariffs of GSP
articles and non-GSP goods shows that eighty-three percent of GSP-
subject imports have a tariff of 7.4% ad valorem or less while only sixty-
nine percent of non-GSP imports fall within this tariff range. As the
figures suggest, the low tariff impact is not due just to a practice of
selecting low-tariff items for eligibility but because tariffs in general have
come down in the developed countries since World War I1. Nevertheless,
as tariffs have been reduced, non-tariff barriers such as "voluntary"
quotas and orderly marketing agreements have been employed with
increased frequency by the developed countries to control imports. This is
a shift of import control mechanisms which a GSP-type scheme can do
little to remedy.
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IMPACT ON THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
An area in which the potential benefits of the GSP have not been
fully realized, and which have not been taken into account in the
calculation, is that degree to which the beneficiary countries actually
utilize the GSP of the United States. Our calculations were based on the
assumption that all of the exports of eligible articles of the Basin
countries entered the United States under the GSP so as to avoid
understanding the potential benefits of the scheme. We do have, however,
data as to the underutilization of the system by a number of the Basin
countries. In 1977, only fifty-five percent of the GSP-subject exports of the
Basin entered the United States duty-free under the GSP. This figure is
extremely low because Mexico, which represents seventy-three percent of
GSP-subject exports from the Basin, had a utilization rate of the GSP of
only forty-nine percent. Excluding Mexico, the rate for the other Basin
countries rises to seventy percent.
This low rate of utilization in the case of Mexico and several other
countries of the Basin has several explanations. One important cause is
the country-of-origin requirements of the GSP. Under the United States
system, an eligible article is considered the product of a beneficiary
country only if at least thirty-five percent of the appraised value of the
good consists of the cost or value of materials produced in the beneficary
country and/or the direct costs of processing the good in that country.
Several Basin countries face the problem that they assemble a number of
U.S. components of GSP-subject articles under TSUS 807.00 and cannot
reach the thirty-five percent value requirement because the U.S.
components do not generally qualify as materials produced in the
beneficiary country. If we exclude from our utilization rate calculation
those GSP articles with significant use of TSUS 807.00, we find that the
overall rate for the Basin increases from fifty-five to eighty-one percent, a
dramatic improvement. 6 It is not known to what degree the remainder is
6. Utilization rates for selected Basin countries in 1977 include:
Utilization Rate without
TSUS 807.00 sensitive
Country Utilization Rate articles
El Salvador 41% 67%
Honduras 55% 56%
Nicaragua 60% 65%
Haiti 39% 82%
Dominican Republic 59% 83%
Mexico 49% 81%
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due to country-of-origin problems of a different source, ignorance of the
GSP on the part of exporters, indifference to the GSP and statistical
errors.
Venezuela has been absent from this discussion because, as a
member of OPEC, it is excluded by law from the GSP of the United
States. This is an exclusion which causes considerable political discord in
the hemisphere but one which has little current economic significance. In
1976, Venezuela exported to the United States GSP-subject goods worth
$14 million. The calculated benefit from trade creation and diversion
through this exclusion amounted to only $1.2 million. Likewise, the
incorporation of petroleum within the GSP would be of no practical
benefit were Venezuela a beneficiary country since the product would
immediately fall into the $25 million competitive-need category and the
thirty-five percent value requirement could not be met since profits do not
qualify as part of this value. Thus, it would appear that the exclusion of
Venezuela is more a political rather than an economic issue, although
that is not meant to demean its importance.
POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM
Based on this analysis, it would appear that the current impact of the
GSP of the United States on the Caribbean Basin countries is not really
significant, and considerable modification would be necessary to alter
that. This could be accomplished through several major changes. First,
the product coverage of the GSP would have to be expanded greatly so as
to include the import-sensitive products which are presently excluded. If
this were done, it would also be necessary to eliminate or greatly expand
quota levels of beneficiary countries to have a positive impact. Secondly,
the $25 million competitive-need limitation would have to be removed
from the law and the scheme. Thirdly, the thirty-five percent country-of-
origin rule could be modified to allow U.S. materials to be counted as
materials of the beneficiary country and increasing in such cases the
local value requirement to fifty percent. It should be noted, however, that
this might benefit primarily multinational corporations which control
most assembly activity in the Basin. Finally, the lifespan of the GSP
might be increased. As the scheme is presently designed, the entire
program is scheduled to terminate at the end of ten years. It has been
suggested that given the time it takes the developing countries to become
familiar with the different schemes, the time in which is left to realize
investments is not sufficient to have the GSP influence an investment
decision.
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OTHER POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
Apart from the U.S. scheme only, another improvement could be
made which would require the cooperation of all the developed countries
which participate in GSP schemes. If they would harmonize their rules
and product coverage, the LDCs would be able to respond more
adequately and the total system would increase the potential advantage
to the developing countries.
Many of the beneficiary developing countries themselves, including
some of the Caribbean Basin countries, need to more aggressively take
advantage of the system. A comparative analysis of the hemisphere with
other regions of the world suggest that Latin and Caribbean countries
have utilized the GSP of the United States far less than some of the
beneficiary nations of the Far East. In fact, between 1975 and 1976,
beneficiary countries of the hemisphere increased their GSP-subject
exports to the United States at only one-half the rate of all other
beneficiary countries combined.
